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Abstract
Despite recent improvements in the national average, stunting levels in Afghanistan exceed 70% in some Provinces. Agriculture
serves as the main source of livelihood for over half of the population and has the potential to be a strong driver of a reduction in
under-nutrition. This article reports research conducted through interviews with stakeholders in agriculture and nutrition in the
capital, Kabul, and four provinces of Afghanistan, to gain a better understanding of the institutional and political factors
surrounding policy making and the nutrition-sensitivity of agriculture. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a total
of 46 stakeholders from central government and four provinces, including staff from international organizations, NGOs and
universities. We found evidence of interdisciplinary communication at the central level and within Provinces, but little evidence
of vertical coordination in policy formulation and implementation between the centre and Provinces. Policy formulation and
decision making were largely sectoral, top-down, and poorly contextualised. The weaknesses identified in policy formulation,
focus, knowledge management, and human and financial resources inhibit the orientation of national agricultural development
strategies towards nutrition-sensitivity. Integrating agriculture and nutrition policies requires explicit leadership from the centre.
However, effectiveness of a food-based approach to reducing nutrition insecurity will depend on decentralising policy ownership
to the regions and provinces through stronger subnational governance. Security and humanitarian considerations point to the need
to manage and integrate in a deliberate way the acute humanitarian care and long-term development needs, of which malnutrition
is just one element.
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1 Introduction
Public health nutrition is a major development priority and a
pillar of the global sustainable development agenda (Horton
and Lo 2013). Tacklingmalnutrition requires a combination of
targeted nutrition-specific interventions to address the imme-
diate causes of malnutrition as well as nutrition-sensitive in-
terventions to address the underlying determinants. Improving
the nutrition-sensitivity of agriculture is an approach to tack-
ling malnutrition that exploits the multiple linkages between
agriculture and nutrition such as food provision, income, em-
ployment and health (Hawkes and Ruel 2011; Ruel and
Alderman 2013).
1.1 Agriculture and nutrition
The close relationship between agriculture and nutrition and
wider contextual factors can be depicted by ordering the 17
Sustainable Development Goals as in Fig. 1. This highlights
those Goals which immediately concern people’s health and
welfare, with food and nutrition at the centre. In the second
ring are those Goals proximally related to agriculture and nu-
trition which plausibly have a less direct but important local
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impact. Depicted outermost are the distal contextual and glob-
al issues, some implying governance, but most of which make
a huge, sometimes less direct, contribution to agriculture and
nutrition. This presentation emphasises how the agriculture
and nutrition sectors are intertwined, and also how the wider
environment of proximal and distal issues constitute signifi-
cant enabling – or disabling – factors.
Agriculture and nutrition are linked in obvious and less
obvious ways. Diverse pathways were outlined by Gillespie
et al. (2012) but the effectiveness of agricultural interventions
upon nutritional outcomes has yet to be conclusively demon-
strated. Reasons for this may be that studies assessing the
effectiveness of agricultural interventions often have method-
ological weaknesses, flawed study designs, and fail to account
for the multiple pathways, as well as the context and environ-
ment in which they operate (Masset et al. 2012). Thus, robust
evidence of linkages between agricultural policy and nutrition
is limited (Dangour et al. 2013).
1.2 The enabling environment
For agricultural interventions and policies to succeed, they
must be embedded within a conducive ‘enabling environ-
ment’ (Gillespie et al. 2013; Ruel and Alderman 2013), mean-
ing ‘the sociocultural, economic, political, institutional and
policy contexts that govern the design and implementation
of nutrition-relevant actions’ (van den Bold et al. 2015:
232). Gillespie et al. (2013) offer a framework for understand-
ing the enabling environment for nutrition consisting of three
key components. The political and governance component of
the framework includes national governments, civil society,
international and national development and research
organisations, academia and the private sector firms which
operate and interact with one another. It refers to the way that
policies and programmes are created as a result of collabora-
tion or conflict between sectors and organisations, the nature
of hierarchical and horizontal governance structures and the
availability and allocation of financial and other resources
(Bryce et al. 2008). The knowledge and evidence component
concerns how data, knowledge and information are created,
distributed and utilised, capturing how nutrition is considered
within a national or international agenda. The framing of an
issue within the policy environment affects how data and ev-
idence are collected and presented, and how they are commu-
nicated to governments and policy makers. The third compo-
nent of the enabling environment highlights the resources and
levels of human capacity within the policy environment in-
cluding the capacity of policy makers, champions and imple-
menters as well as the national and organisational capacity,
finances and resource prioritisation.
These elements of an enabling environment focus on policy
and capacity. However, they omit important contextual com-
ponents suggested in Fig. 1, which recognises the SDGs as a
comprehensive set of interrelated challenges. Therefore, in ad-
dition, we suggest that within the wider enabling environment
there is, first, the natural resources base on which agriculture
depends. This encompasses the soils, water and biodiversity,
all of which in many places are threatened by climate change
and rising temperatures, which phenomena in turn increase the
risk of natural disasters (Blaney et al. 2009; Poole et al. 2016a).
Second, security, justice and accountability are essential for
productive activities, in rural and urban areas, and for house-
hold well-being (Barnett and Adger 2007; Lynch et al. 2013).
Third, governance is the reach of the state and the non-state or
Source: adapted from Waage and Yap (2015) and Poole (2017: 10). 
Fig. 1 Agriculture, nutrition and
the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). Source: adapted
from Waage and Yap (2015) and
Poole (2017: 10)
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private delivery of public goods and services. These include
education, energy and infrastructure which are essential for
development and improvements in the agriculture, nutrition
and health sectors. These components are weak or absent in
fragile states. This article concerns Afghanistan, where the
delivery of public services is largely contracted to non-
governmental organizations (Poole 2018). This public-NGO,
or PUNGO, modality has advantages but also creates tensions.
Finally, like capacity, political leadership by strong individuals
has been identified as a common element of success in tackling
under-nutrition (Nisbett et al. 2015; Nisbett and Barnett 2017).
The research reported here was part of the DFID-funded re-
search programmeLeveragingAgriculture for Nutrition in South
Asia (LANSA). Analysis of the enabling environment and the
nutrition-sensitivity of agricultural policies in South Asia has
been central to LANSA. The research aims to identify opportu-
nities for agriculture and food policies to increase impacts on
nutrition in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.
Among the research projects completed by the consortium are
explorations of the political, institutional and policy challenges
of creating nutrition-sensitive agricultural policies in India,
Bangladesh and Pakistan (Gillespie et al. 2015); and analysing
stakeholders’ knowledge, and the political and institutional con-
text of, nutrition-sensitive agriculture (van den Bold et al. 2015).
In this paper we examine the extent to which an enabling
environment for nutrition-sensitive agriculture exists within
the fourth LANSA country, Afghanistan. The objectives of
the research were not policy analysis per se, but understanding
the perceptions and practices of policy makers and other
stakeholders themselves, concerning sectoral and inter-
sectoral policies and processes: to identify and evaluate the
evidence base linking agriculture to nutrition, understand the
perceptions of decision makers about policy making and im-
plementation, and identify the capacities for improving nutri-
tion through the agrifood system.
We draw lessons about the specific challenges of politics
and governance, knowledge and evidence, as well as capacity
and resources. In the next section (2) we review the Afghan
context, and provide an account of the research methods
(section 3), results (section 4) and discussion (section 4).
Conclusions relate specifically to this case, but include lessons
for the broader Asian context and for other conflict and post-
conflict situations where agriculture, nutrition and health are
compromised (section 5).
2 Afghanistan: agriculture, nutrition
and the wider enabling environment
Afghanistan is primarily an agrarian country (MAIL 2015):
80% of the total population and 90% of the poor live in rural
areas (World Bank 2014). Agriculture accounts for 40% of the
labour market and about one-quarter of national gross
domestic product (GDP), excluding the opium poppy econo-
my (CSO 2014). GDP growth, driven principally by agricul-
ture (World Bank Group 2017) was expected to be 2.6% in
2017. This lags the average annual population growth rate of
3% (World Bank 2017b).
Wheat is the principal food crop in Afghanistan, while
fruits and nuts, and livestock products such as wool continue
to play a large part in subsistence, in local marketed produc-
tion, and some part in exports. On average, per capita con-
sumption of wheat is 152 kg/year, among the highest in the
world (Naseri undated).
Afghanistan is largely arid, but with productive agriculture
in fertile well-watered valleys, and a significant pastoral econ-
omy: almost 70% of the population keep livestock of some
sort (MAIL 2015). Dupree’s study during the period of rela-
tive peace and prosperity preceding the Soviet invasion in
1979, which precipitated the series of conflicts which have
lasted almost four decades, illustrates the potential of
Afghan agriculture and how much has been lost (Dupree
1977). She recorded a diverse and productive agriculture: be-
sides major crops like wheat, maize, sesame, potatoes and
rice, there were plums, apples and pears, apricots, figs, mul-
berries, cherries and almonds, walnuts and pistachios, figs and
pomegranates, citrus, melons and watermelons. Other signif-
icant crops were sunflower, sesame, cotton and sugar cane.
Raisins and fresh grapes constituted one of Afghanistan’s
principal export sectors: ‘Afghanistan once produced 20% of
the world’s raisins. In the 1970s, Afghan cut flowers graced
tables from the Middle East to Europe’ (MAIL 2018).
Livestock products were also important in home consumption
as well as for local sale and export: meat, milk, cheese and
fibres.
In a predominantly agricultural society, why is malnutrition
so serious, and what can be done?
2.1 The current fragile context
Afghanistan is often described as a fragile or failed state, with
serious negative consequences for human welfare, among oth-
er results. There is no single understanding of ‘fragility’
(Coburn and Larson 2014). The UK Department for
International Development (DFID) proposes a somewhat nar-
row interpretation of failure in the political senses of lack of
authority, failure to provide services and lack of legitimacy
(Brown et al. 2009). Börzel and Risse (2015) use different
concepts and terminology to analyse political economy that
are useful for this research into agriculture and nutrition pol-
icies. They prefer to characterize as areas of ‘limited state-
hood’ situations where the formal state is dysfunctional or
absent. In such contexts, governance through the provision
of rules and regulations and the delivery of public services is
sustained by institutions that are ‘functional equivalents’ of
the formal state.
Are agriculture and nutrition policies and practice coherent? Stakeholder evidence from Afghanistan
The enduring interventions in Afghanistan since 1978
overlay an historical fragility that frustrates governance and
nationhood in multiple ways. Political fragmentation is
enmeshed with cultural diversity, geographical extremes of
temperature and altitude, military conflict, the drugs economy,
weak public infrastructure and services, environmental vul-
nerability and migration. In the context of Afghanistan, we
understand ‘fragility’ to encompass ongoing conflict, depen-
dence on high levels of humanitarian aid, significant political
instability, a weak capacity to carry out the basic state func-
tions of governance and public services delivery, lacking co-
hesive and productive relations with society and a climate of
natural disasters and environmental threats (Stewart and
Brown 2009; FAO 2010; Gupte 2017; OECD 2017).
It is simplistic – but sufficient for our immediate purposes –
to suggest that there are at least three major areas of gover-
nance in Afghanistan that could be regarded as Börzel and
Risse’s functional equivalents of the state: first, the presence
of international donor organisations representing overseas
governments; second, the almost ubiquitous presence of the
non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector, both national
and international, which delivers public services such as the
Basic Package of Health Services; and third, the diffuse social,
tribal, political, economic, criminal and religious structures
and relations which are the fundamental but often obscure
fabric of society (Minoia et al. 2014; Mallett and Pain 2017;
Cheng et al. 2018). These are all important components of the
‘wider enabling environment’.
The NGO sector is critical for service delivery particularly
in health but also other areas of development and delivery of
public services such as agriculture and education. Public ser-
vices and project interventions are undertaken through part-
nerships between central government and NGO implementing
organisations, often with the support of international organi-
sations such as bilateral donors, UN agencies and the World
Bank, a modality which redresses the limited capacities of the
public sector in terms of human and financial resources and
access to remote communities (Newbrander et al. 2014;
Varkey et al. 2015; Poole 2018). For a resource-poor and
conflict-ridden country, the PUNGO partnership approach is
a workable solution. The complexity of the public
sector-(I)NGO modality is signalled in section 2.2.4 in rela-
tion to food security and nutrition policy.
2.1.1 Poverty
In the United Nations Human Development Index for 2015,
Afghanistan ranked 171 out of 188, the lowest of any country
outside Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 2015). In 2007–2008,
36% of the population in Afghanistan was counted as poor
(World Bank 2015). Most economic and growth indicators
show very slow progress in the last decade (United Nations
2015), and slower than any other South Asian economy
during 2014 and 2015 (Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction 2016). The most recent data
showed a worsening economic environment, with increases
in unemployment and a rise in the poverty rate from 36% in
2011–12 to 39% in 2013–14, and an increase in rural poverty
to 44% (World Bank 2017a).
2.1.2 Nutrition
A major food crisis in the early 2000s led to massive human-
itarian intervention. The national rate of child malnutrition
reduced from a catastrophic national level of more than 60%
stunting recorded in 2003/04 to about 40% in 2011/12. High
levels of hunger and micronutrient deficiencies persist, with
stunting levels still exceeding 70% in some Provinces
(UNICEF 2014). Food insecurity based on calorie consump-
tion increased from 28.2% of the population to 30.1% be-
tween the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment survey
periods 2007/08 and 2011/12 (CSO 2014). Micronutrient de-
ficiencies are strongly implicated inmalnutrition amongwom-
en and adolescent girls (Flores-Martínez et al. 2016), perpet-
uating generational consequences. While there are multiple
causes of malnutrition, under-nutrition and lack of dietary di-
versity are significant causes and point to the need to target
micronutrient deficiencies rather than generalised food inse-
curity (Levitt et al. 2009).
2.1.3 Agriculture
To improve nutritional status, a multipronged approach has
been called for (Johnecheck and Holland 2007). Afghanistan
has huge potential to re-orientate the whole agriculture sector
towards the nutrition agenda but integrated, multi-sectoral pol-
icy making faces many challenges (Levitt et al. 2010; Levitt
et al. 2011). Developing (licit) agriculture has been a recent
focus (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2016; Poole et al.
2016b; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction 2016). However, sustainability of production
systems is under threat. The threats to food and nutrition se-
curity are due, among other things, to ‘climate change, partic-
ularly the expected increase in the frequency and intensity of
weather-related hazards; environmental conditions such as
land degradation, deforestation, desertification and water scar-
city’ (GoIRA 2012b: 59).
2.1.4 The wider enabling environment
Since 2001, Afghanistan has received hundreds of billions of
dollars in foreign aid money – over $100 billion of which has
come from the US alone (Lutz and Desai 2015). While such
money is in theory earmarked for development, the primary
aims have been security, nation-building and post-conflict re-
construction. Creating an enabling environment in
Poole N. et al.
Afghanistan requires overcoming impediments not present in
most other development contexts. The withdrawal of
International Security Assistance Forces during 2014 led to a
collapse in the trade, construction and services sectors of the
economy. The resurgence of Non-State Armed Groups
(NSAGs) since 2015 has increased the fragility of markets,
public services and regional integration. The massive financial
inflows have fed corruption. Complex interrelationships exist
between Afghanistan and neighbouring Iran and Pakistan that
are not only geopolitical in nature but also concern agribusi-
ness interests (Minoia et al. 2014). New humanitarian dynam-
ics of emigration co-exist with increasing internal displace-
ment and the return of refugees (see, for example, OCHA
(2017)).
2.2 The policy and institutional architecture
The policy environment since 2001 has been characterised by
a proliferation of initiatives, strategies, revisions and acro-
nyms. Adoption and implementation of policies has been
much less fruitful. Around the time of this study, more com-
prehensive and integrated approaches were in the process of
formulation, but have not yet been implemented (AFSANA/
AFSeN, below). It is not the intention to document all related
policies, but below we summarise key elements at the time of
writing.
The commitment to food and nutrition security is
underpinned by Articles 13 and 14 of the Afghanistan consti-
tution. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy
(ANDS) constituted Afghanistan’s first multi-sectoral poverty
reduction strategy, from 2008 to 2013 (MoE 2014). ANDS
was complex, with 86 expected outcomes and 276 indicators
including the agriculture and rural development and public
health sectors. The latter was one of the more successful ele-
ments, focusing on reproductive and child health systems,
notably with the introduction of the Basic Package of Health
Services. Preventative strategies for public health and nutri-
tion were not evident. Effectively, ANDS has been superseded
by the Afghanistan National Peace and Development
Framework (ANPDF) under the Ministry of Finance, now
running from 2017 to 2021, with a focus on agriculture, ex-
tractive industries and trade as drivers of economic growth
(MoF 2017). Agriculture is perceived therein as a source of
employment, business generation and exports.
2.2.1 National priority programs (NPPs)
The National Priority Programmes (NPPs) are a set of 22
specific programmes and policies, grouped into six clusters
that build upon the overall strategy outlined in ANDS, and
now taken forward into the ANPDF. Ministries execute relat-
ed programs. Within the NPPs, the Agriculture and Rural
Development cluster contains nationwide programmes on
water and natural resource management, agriculture, rural ac-
cess and strengthening local institutions.
Food and nutrition objectives are linked to ten of the ongo-
ing National Priority Programmes (MoF 2017). The latest
National Comprehensive Agriculture Development Priority
Program 2016–2021, including attention to food and nutrition
(Strategic Priority 6: Food and Nutrition Security, and
Resilience Building) is one of the National Priority
Programmes.
Another NPP is the Women’s Economic Empowerment
Program, an inter-ministerial initiative involving the
Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
(MOLSAMD) and the Ministry of Women Affairs (MOWA)
(GoIRA 2016b). This is conceived primarily in economic
terms and includes agriculture as a sector in which women
are significantly active but from which nutrition is largely
absent. Women’s affairs and capacity building for health are
addressed under the Human Resource Development cluster.
2.2.2 The national solidarity programme (NSP)
and the citizen’s charter
The National Solidarity Programme was managed by the
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD).
The mechanism of NSP projects was to engage directly with
communities, thus promoting community control over devel-
opment initiatives. The MRRD contracted out activities in
specific provinces and districts to implementing NGO part-
ners. These implementing organisations facilitated the estab-
lishment of democratically-elected Community Development
Councils (CDCs) who submitted proposals to and received
funds from the MRRD. Projects were mostly infrastructure-
based but touched upon pathways from agriculture to nutrition
by increasing access to markets and raising household in-
comes. The NSP and its linkages to the population through
CDCs is considered to have functioned well (Nijat et al.
2016).
This operational modality is the foundation of the new
Citizens’ Charter (GoIRA 2016a), which is a partnership be-
tween the state and local communities. It aims to improve the
delivery of a ‘basic package of services’ (modelled on the
Basic Package of Health Services below) including education,
basic rural infrastructure and agriculture services. CDCs will
operate in both urban and rural community development
programmes, with powers also devolved to city mayors and
provincial governors in holding line ministries to account.
2.2.3 Agriculture
The ANDS had two main agricultural components: the
Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development
(CARD) strategy and the Agricultural and Rural
Development Zone (ARDZ) initiative. The ANPDF has
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subsumed the CARD, becoming the National Comprehensive
Agriculture Development Priority Program (MAIL 2016).
Five of the seven Priority Programs are oriented towards in-
creasing productivity of agricultural subsectors, and improved
resources management. The Strategic Priority 6: Food and
Nutrition Security, and Resilience Building is one of the
National Priority Programmes and encompasses efforts direct-
ed towards agricultural development which enhances food
availability, access and dietary diversity: ‘MAIL will collabo-
rate closely with other Afghanistan Food Security and
Nutrition Agenda (AFSANA) members to coordinate efforts
through its Extension Workers and Home Economists to im-
prove feeding and food preparation practices in a systematic
and sustainable manner’ (MAIL 2016: 23).
A flagship activity is the Comprehensive Agriculture and
Rural Development Facility (CARD-F), comprising invest-
ments through economic development packages in production
and processing for selected value chains such as apiculture,
cotton, pomegranates, poultry, saffron, and in the requisite
public infrastructure to make agribusiness markets work. It
focuses on commercialisation among a subset of farmers,
aiming to diversify sources of income, improve farmers’ ca-
pacity through the provision of training and skills, and orien-
tate agriculture towards markets. ARDZ, however, focused on
large-scale agribusinesses and aimed to release state-owned
land into the hands of private firms such as agro-processing
enterprises. While neither strategy intentionally focused on
agriculture-nutrition linkages, the policies do touch upon a
number of pathways including raising incomes, lowering food
prices, increased consumption from own production and post-
harvesting processing.
2.2.4 Health
Considerable progress has been made in building a functional
health service since 2001 (Salama and Alwan 2016). Several
drivers of positive health sector outcomes have been identified
that essentially concern the management and coordination of
the system (Dalil et al. 2014). Fundamental has been the de-
cision for the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) to contract
out to international and national non-government organisa-
tions the responsibility to implement the Basic Package of
Health Services (BPHS). BPHS has been the cornerstone of
public health interventions and is credited with having made
significant improvements to the health status of the population
(Newbrander et al. 2014).
The Public Nutrition Department (PND) of MoPH is re-
sponsible for the nutrition activities of the BPHS. Nutritional
gains have beenmarginal, and more budget and better policies
for improving nutrition are required (Varkey et al. 2015).
Largely because of contextual issues, delivery is high cost
and uneven across the country (Akseer et al. 2016), and much
more remains to be done, particularly in the realm of nutrition
(Varkey et al.; Salama and Alwan 2016). Data from the latest
National Nutrition Survey (UNICEF 2014) suggest that health
sector policies are focused on the treatment of severe clinical
malnutrition and prevention of malnutrition through supple-
mentation and food distribution programmes. Public sector
‘therapeutic’ approaches are supported by international agen-
cies such as UNICEF who are involved in micronutrient dis-
tribution: for example, distribution of iron and folate to ado-
lescent girls in schools. Food-based approaches have not been
prominent hitherto.
Despite the improvements, a 2015 review of the health
sector and MoPH identified a lack of specific strategic activ-
ities, goals, M&E frameworks, implementation and review
plans, shortages of financial and human capacity and commit-
ment, and insufficient inter-sectoral coordination (MoPH
2016). The new National Health Strategy 2016–2020 marks
a shift towards specific objectives, implementation plans and
monitoring, and an intention to decentralise and work within
revised operating principles. The strategy to reduce acute and
chronic malnutrition is through public health interventions,
sustaining a curative approach, and in particular the treatment
of micronutrient deficiency diseases. The closest the docu-
ment gets to food-based approaches is Strategic Result 3.1.4:
‘Increased awareness about nutrition is achieved, as is adop-
tion of healthy food practices among the general population’
(p. 37). Consideration of ‘agriculture’ is absent from the doc-
ument. On the other hand, controlling the quality of imported
food is a ‘top policy priority’ (p.7).
2.2.5 Afghanistan food security and nutrition agenda
(AFSANA/AFSeN)
The Afghanistan Food Security and Nutrition Agenda
(AFSANA, or latterly AFSeN) will be a key policy. It was
initiated in 2012, delivered for review to the Ministry of
Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) in July 2015
and launched in October 2017 by the Chief Executive of
Afghanistan.1 On the same occasion Afghanistan joined the
Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement. AFSeN addresses
directly and comprehensively the issues of food availability,
access, food utilisation and nutrition. Horizontal and vertical
links are envisaged among the principal ministries at the cen-
tral level, and with international organisations and civil soci-
ety. It will link to sub-national governance through provincial,
district and community organisations and local councils, or
‘shuras’.2
1 http://www.emro.who.int/afg/afghanistan-news/afghanistan-launches-food-
security-and-nutrition-agenda-to-fight-malnutrition.html
2 ‘Shura’ is a term derived from Arabic and used for a consultative body or
local council.
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The complexity of the policy and institutional architecture
is illustrated by the number of government and other bodies
envisaged at the outset:
‘They include central government ministries and agen-
cies, decentralized and local government institutions as
well as UN organizations, donor agencies, NGOs, civil
society and the private sector organizations… The main
players at the central government level are MAIL,
MRRD, MoPH, MoLSAMD (Ministry of Labor,
Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled) and ANDMA
(Afghanistan National Disaster Management
Authority). Others with direct or facilitating roles are
MoCI (Ministry of Commerce and Industry), MoE
(Ministry of Education), Ministry of Energy and Water
(MoEW), CSO (Central Statistics Organization),
Ministry of Women Affairs (MoWA), Ministry of
Finance (MoF) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MoFA)’ (GoIRA 2012: 26).
Implementation andmonitoring will be overseen by the Office
of the Chief executive, and representatives from tenministries,
donors and international organisations.
3 Research questions and methods
3.1 Agri-nutrition impact pathways
In the current unpropitious context, the fundamental question
underlying the LANSA research programme was to identify
how agriculture and agrifood systems can be better designed
through appropriate policies, interventions and strategies to
improve the nutritional status of children and women. Six
potential agriculture-nutrition impact pathways are as follows
(Kadiyala et al. 2014):
1. Agricultural production as a source of food for own
consumption
2. Agricultural sales and employment as a source of income
for household expenditures on food and non-food goods
3. Agricultural and food policies which influence food ac-
cess and availability through relative prices and afford-
ability of specific foods, and foods in general
4. Women’s roles in agriculture, household decision making
and resource allocation affecting intra-household alloca-
tions of, and expenditures on, food, health and care
5. Women’s employment in agriculture balanced with child
care and feeding responsibilities
6. Women’s own nutrition and health status, affecting
childcare and nutrition, which may be compromised by
own agricultural labour
Two additional impact pathways are possible, which have
potentially sector- and economy-wide effects:
7. Competition and entrepreneurism in the scale and diver-
sity of agricultural production, and changes in productiv-
ity, which affect food access and availability at market, cf.
household level
8. Changes in the agricultural sector and related industries as
a whole which have a macro-level and medium-to-long
term impact on gross domestic product and productivity
3.2 Research design
The research design was adapted from work in Bangladesh,
India and Pakistan (van den Bold et al. 2015), which in turn
was based on Gillespie et al. (2013). Changes were made to
take into account the local context and regional differences,
with particular emphasis on meeting provincial stakeholders.
The work was undertaken between 2015 and 2017 by SOAS
University of London staff of the DFID-funded LANSA re-
search consortium in collaboration with the local partner, the
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU).
3.2.1 Data collection
The research was based on the work of Gillespie et al. (2013)
whose framework for ‘creation of an enabling environment
for accelerated under-nutrition reduction’ has guided the
whole LANSA research programme. Data were collected
through semi-structured interviews using a questionnaire with
three sections covering stakeholders’ perceptions of the
following:
1. The political and institutional context, governance sys-
tems, structures and processes
2. Knowledge and evidence concerning nutrition and agri-
culture policies
3. Stakeholder and policymaking capacity and resources
This framework has also been used to shape the results
section and guide the analysis and conclusions.
Interviews were conducted between May and September
2015 in the capital, Kabul, and in the four provincial capitals
of Badakhshan (Faizabad), Bamyan (Bamyan City),
Kandahar (Kandahar City) and Nangarhar (Jalalabad). These
provinces were selected to achieve a high degree of regional
representation in terms of agriculture, remoteness and ethnic-
ity; also, in these regions access could be facilitated by the
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit; and physical in-
security could be minimised (Fig. 2).
Initial respondents were purposively-selected staff from
public sector organisations, (I)NGOs ((international) non-
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governmental organisations), and universities who were will-
ing to participate, and then approached through a
‘snowballing’ technique. Table 1 lists the respondents’
organisational affiliations, with females indicated by an aster-
isk. A total of 46 interviews were conducted.
Individual anonymity was assured, and therefore identifi-
able positions have not been reported. Included among the
central government respondents was one Deputy Minister.
Others were at Director-level and below. Provincial govern-
ment staff interviewed included one Deputy Governor,
Department Directors, programme managers and Provincial
Council members. United Nations (UN) staff interviewed in-
cluded programme and regional managers. NGO staff
interviewed included programme and regional managers,
heads of section and technical specialists. University staff
were two lecturers and one university Dean. Some inter-
viewees had a double affiliation, for example, university and
NGO. Their primary affiliation has been used in reporting.
Six experienced national enumerators (five male, one fe-
male) were trained in the overall objectives of the research
programme and the significant regional agriculture and nutri-
tion issues and linkages. Enumerators tested the questionnaire
among stakeholders in Kabul and appropriate changes were
made to clarify questions. The interviews were conducted
from April to September 2015, beginning in Kabul.
Interviews were conducted in the offices of the respondents
in Dari and Pashto languages. Interviews lasted from 1 to 3 h,
occasionally longer and over a two-day period. Sometimes,
interviewees were accompanied by a junior colleague (in one
case by a female colleague, not included in Table 1).
Occasionally a senior public sector official handed over the
interview to another colleague with more practical experience
of agriculture and nutrition. Such interviews have been re-
corded as a single event with the first interviewee as the re-
spondent. In one NGO interview, four staff were present, and
views recorded acknowledged some differences of opinion.
3.2.2 Data analysis and validation
Interviews were recorded, and translated and transcribed into
English. All transcripts were scrutinised and key concepts
identified and related to the questionnaire objectives and ques-
tions. Key topics were coded using QSR NVivo and analysed
using queries, text searches and word frequencies. The node
Table 1 Stakeholder respondents: organizational type and geographical origin
Organisation type Central government Provincial government UN agency NGO University Other
Badakhshan BDK 3 2 4
Bamyan BMN 4 5* 1
Kabul KBL 4** 1 4
Kandahar KDH 3 4 1 1 cooperative
Nangarhar NGH 3 4 1 1 consultancy
* female; ** two females
Source: author 
Fig. 2 Afghanistan showing
interview locations. Source:
author
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structure was refined and data were re-coded during the anal-
ysis as new themes emerged. The report records the principal
themes emerging from the stakeholder interviews.
Additional data from public sources and from the prelimi-
nary interviews in Kabul, Jalalabad, Nangarhar and in
Kandahar have been clearly signalled in footnotes.
For the purposes of data validation, a knowledge-sharing
event was held in Kabul in April 2016. This was a half-day
dialogue with stakeholders including some of the central and
provincial respondents. Comments from participants at this
event have been used in this report and signalled as such in
the text. Sources of quotations are indicated by the type of
organisation and the Province, abbreviated as in Table 1.
This manuscript draws on work previously published as a
working paper (Poole et al. 2016b).
4 Results
We present the outcomes of interviews in terms of the three
domains identified earlier which informed the data collection
(Gillespie et al. 2013):
& framing, generation and communication of knowledge
and evidence
& the political economy of stakeholders, ideas and interests
& individual, organisational and systemic capacity and
resources
4.1 Framing, generation and communication
of knowledge and evidence: policy and underlying
narratives
This section concerns the approaches, issues and priorities for
agriculture and nutrition that underlie policies, and how
knowledge is collected and deployed, and the communication
mechanisms. An account of the policies, political economy of
stakeholders and policy making procedures follows in section
4.2, with questions of resources and capacity covered in sec-
tion 4.3.
4.1.1 Limited perceptions of agri-nutrition impact pathways
Of the pathways through which agriculture can impact
nutrition, the importance of food production, incomes
from agricultural sales, and employment in agriculture
were widely recognised by stakeholders (pathways 1–3
in section 3.1 above). There was negligible reference
made to the multiple agro-economic and household roles
of women set out in pathways 4–6: there was little aware-
ness of the cross-cutting roles of women within the house-
hold, in agriculture, nutrition and economic development,
and linkages between ministries on gender were not
flagged in discussions. The exception was a respondent
from MoWA who expressed strong aspirations about col-
laboration with other organisations:
‘We are the one Ministry to focus on women’s situation
in Afghanistan and we should add gender issues in all
po l i c i es , p lans and s t r a t eg ies . ’ CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT, KBL.
Pathways 7–8 concerning meso and macro business and eco-
nomic dimensions were implicit in some discussions but were
not clearly articulated. Nevertheless, issues to do with food
safety, agricultural trade, imports and exports and international
agreements were raised in some interviews.
Most interviewees commented favourably on policies
that promote nutrition through increasing the volume of
food production and boosting agricultural incomes.
Agriculture as a source of food security was discussed
in terms of quantities and caloric content, but the micro-
nutrient content of food and the importance of dietary
diversity were less considered. Although respondents sug-
gested that sectoral policies addressing agriculture and
nutrition linkages may exist, few respondents could name
specific policies. A lack of cross-sectoral policies was
widely attributed to the absence of coordination between
sectors at the national and provincial levels. All respon-
dents agreed on the need for more collaboration:
‘I have worked inMoPH [Ministry of Public Health] for
about 11 years; I haven’t seen anyone from the agricul-
ture sector participate in the policy making workshops
or meetings in here. To be honest, we don’t know about
their policies and they don’t know about ours.’ NGO,
KDH.
The concepts of food security and nutrition were prevalent in
the language of NGOs. However, a comment made at the
stakeholder consultation in Kabul in April 2016 implied the
lack of a precise understanding of the actual challenges for
food security and nutrition policies. With exceptions, the ap-
pearance was of a food security ‘bandwagon’ associated with
securing external finance rather than a substantive and well-
articulated commitment to improving nutrition:
‘Every NGO claims that they are working on food se-
curity.’ NGO, BMN.
‘In Afghanistan mostly the stakeholders and NGOs are
working on food security but diversity of food is really
much more important… For example, some people are
producing eggs and while selling eggs they buy cake
instead, and they have no knowledge of the nutrition.’
NGO, validation event, KBL.
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4.1.2 Agricultural sector priorities: a strong production
orientation
Rather than nutrition-sensitivity, approaches within the
agricultural sector were perceived to be ‘productivist’,
and focused upon three objectives: increasing agricultural
production; providing jobs and economic growth; and ad-
dressing the need to reduce dependence on imported
foods. An important consideration was to develop patterns
of rural development that would reduce dependence on
narcotics. Agriculture as a licit source of income and em-
ployment was the pathway most frequently discussed by
informants.
Overall, there was a sound understanding of the importance
of agriculture for the national economy as a whole, and for
poverty reduction in particular.
‘Here in Kandahar our objective is to increase produc-
tion so that people can easily get access to food prod-
ucts; when they have good access to food products, the
problem of malnutrition will decrease.’ PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT, KDH.
‘Our agriculture department… mainly focuses on in-
creasing agricultural production. But the possible effects
that increasing agricultural production have on improv-
ing nutrition… are given less consideration.’ NGO,
BDK.
‘What they focus on in the agriculture sector is creating
jobs for people and getting income from that. These
issues have an indirect role for nutrition. When people
cultivate their lands they just want to get income out of
it.’ NGO, KDH.
4.1.3 Agricultural trade and food quality concerns
There was widespread unease about Afghanistan’s reliance on
food imports which were alleged to be unfit for consumption,
and the lack of control of imports by central government.
Food safety and agro-industrial policies were said to be weak,
and border controls deficient. Interviewees noted the negative
implications for health and safety, as well as problems for
developing the domestic agribusiness sector. (I)NGO and gov-
ernment officials alike commented:
‘Now all the products that are imported from other coun-
tries are all labelled ‘JUST FOR EXPORT’ and it shows
that our neighbours are just sending poison for us to
eat… we are dependent on our neighbour ’ .
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, KBL.
‘The chickens that are imported, they are expired to the
point where even their bones have changed to the colour
black.’ PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, BMN.
‘There are expired goods that came from Pakistan and
Iran.’ NGO, BDK.
‘There is huge administrative corruption and we are re-
ally having lots of problems… The blame goes to
Kabul, to the norm and standards directorate of MoPH
because they should consider all the products but they
don’t.’ CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, KBL.
4.1.4 Therapeutic approaches to treatment of malnutrition
Many interviewees acknowledged that MoPH is primarily
concerned with clinical diagnosis, treatment and cure of mal-
nutrition. This therapeutic approach was also evident within
the departments of nutrition at the provincial level. Health
sector NGOs focused on hunger, food security and the treat-
ment of severe under-nutrition. One health professional made
a distinction between nutrition and health, the former not be-
ing the responsibility of MoPH, even though the Public
Nutrition Department (PND) is embedded within MoPH.
Interviewees commented on the delivery of treatments
through existing state (although often NGO-run) infrastruc-
ture such as clinics and hospitals, with lower-severity malnu-
trition cases dealt with via in-home supplementary feeding
programmes. This was the BPHS. Agriculture and food-
based approaches were not widely acknowledged. No signif-
icant reference was made about the continuity of treatment or
support after ‘curative treatment’ of acute malnutrition and
short-term supplementary feeding interventions. There was
no commitment to ongoing policies and support of households
to prevent chronic malnutrition.
A series of significant quotations signals the gap between
agriculture and nutrition, and nutrition and health:
‘All the NGOs which work for development haven’t
evaluated nutrition based on health and no-one has fo-
cused on the quality of food yet. They are just working
on increasing food quantity.’ NGO, KBL.
‘Through WFP [UNWorld Food Programme], we have
a programme at district levels that distributes enriched
flour and enriched oil to the families affected with mal-
nutrition. They also distribute ready-made foods which
are useful for the treatment of children who are affected
by malnutrition. Those programmes were useful to cure
malnutrition.’ NGO, BDK.
‘Nutrition is not our main purpose here; our main focus
is on health. It is the responsibility of DoPH
[Department of Public Health] to cure all malnutrition-
affected patients. We admit those patients who have in-
tensive malnutrition in hospitals and we cure them.
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, BDK.
‘According to the measurement of malnutrition that the
children have, the doctors will decide which medicine
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they should give to the patient and for how long, which
is for three months, six months or a one year period.
They get the medicine from UNICEF [United Nations
Children’s Fund] through a proposal, then UNICEF
makes a contract with the other companies and distrib-
utes these products for them.’ UN AGENCY, BDK.
4.1.5 Humanitarian interventions
The therapeutic approach was evidenced by interviewees who
reiterated the importance of food supplementation for at-risk
groups. A lack of evidence of longer term food-based
programmes strongly suggested that emergency and humani-
tarian interventions for nutrition were delinked from agricul-
ture and longer term development interventions.
‘We deliver the food to people while WFP helps us by
providing food. In this programme, we check and mea-
sure the arms of the women. We cover those pregnant
women whose arms are less than 23 cm and lactating
women who have children older than six months. In this
project we deliver them complete healthy food; wheat,
flour, salt, oil, and vitamin A.’ NGO, BDK.
‘The food products we distribute to them are standard
and approved by both WFP and MoPH. Most of these
products are milk and other foods, which are useful for
malnutrition problems, and we cure the malnutrition pa-
tients by these food products.’ PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT, BDK.
This therapeutic approach was criticised by a rare voice from
an NGO for its short-termism and the common subsequent
withdrawal of emergency services, without responding to the
long-term needs:
‘WFP have done lots of work in the nutrition section in
here… These sorts of works are not very helpful be-
cause their projects are short-term and after sometime
they stop their aid. Instead of this type of help, they
should implement more useful projects. We have lots
of arable lands, water, and human resources. Instead of
distributing food products they should improve the ag-
riculture sector here and teach people how to produce
food products; that type of project will be more effec-
tive.’ NGO, KDH.
4.1.6 Research methods and management
Responses concerning the role of data and evidence in con-
tributing to policy formulation highlighted a contrast between
the theoretical evidence-based policy making process and the
reality expressed by most respondents throughout the inter-
views. On the one hand, a respondent from the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs (MoWA) expressed confidence in the sys-
tem, and supporting views were also found amongst NGOs.
One DAIL (Department of Agriculture, Irrigation and
Livestock) official explained the principles:
‘MAIL formulates all the policies based on the four
principal programmes. They start formulating their pol-
icies from villages and districts. First they conduct sev-
eral surveys and collect information about the problems
and needs of the people. Based on the survey results,
they make a proposal, they sort and prioritize the prob-
lems and then they make a complete plan or policy.
Then they send the policy to the Ministry of Finance
to ge t the budge t for i t s implementa t ion . ’
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, KDH.
However, research methods were reported to be weak, and
data were either inaccurate or missing for many areas.
Security concerns were cited as the main reason for lack of
understanding of local realities. In fact, lack of security was
said to affect every stage of the policy making process from
the collection of survey data through the implementation of
projects to the monitoring and evaluation of projects. Apart
from national surveys — seen as infrequent, incomplete and
unreliable — much of the data collection is done by NGOs
and implementing partners when seeking contracts and ten-
ders or evaluating programmes. As a result, there are concerns
over conflicts of interest.
‘Sometimes the data are not accurate. They exaggerate
and they do not tell the truth…They show weak data
because they think that if they do so, theywill havemore
funds.’ NGO, BAMYAN.
‘They try their best but there are some problems, maybe
security problems, or the people who work with them
can’t get the exact information. They can't go to some
places because of the security problem and the people
they have hired don’t give the right information to the
policy makers.’PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT,
KDH.
Several times questions were raised about both the low quality
of data collected when research is conducted, and the lack of
oversight of the research process, and fabrication of data.3 The
use of data was also an issue of contention, with many
3 During a previous interview that preceded this research, an official of a
humanitarian organisation who had previously worked with an international
NGO commented that when conducting research, he had issued his enumera-
tors with tablets which, unknown to them, recorded GPS data and the timing of
interviews. It turned out that 30% of surveys were completed in the office. ‘All
data collection is tainted by this issue’.
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respondents frustrated that data collected do not get used to
formulate policy. Stimulating the academic sector, especially
technical agricultural research institutes, was seen as impor-
tant. Some organisations were engaged in agricultural re-
search but respondents from universities felt their research
was not incorporated into the policy making process. The
implications of weak research for policy making were
expressed succinctly:
‘The main problem is that data are not accurate, sur-
veyors don’t collect accurate data, and the reason for
that is obvious, there are security issues and a lack of
supervisory attention to control their surveyor and
whether they actually go to the field or not.’
UNIVERSITY, KDH.
‘Why are their policies not effective? Because they
don’t conduct any research and surveys and they don’t
make policies based on research... In this country we
don’t have accurate data.’ NGO, KDH.
4.1.7 Knowledge management
Knowledge management and communication were consid-
ered to be weak. Modern information and communications
technology is used for internal management within many
implementing organisations. Communication systems be-
tween organisations were said to consist of an ad hoc array
of media: use of telephones prevails, especially cellphones;
email contact was said to be common among NGOs but less
so with government organisations. Face-to-face meetings in
Kabul are rendered problematic by the insecurity in the city.
One respondent emphasised that official business with gov-
ernment often adhered to use of hard copy and ordinary mail.
An official of a UN organisation summarised the patterns of
inter-organisational communication, with emphasis on how
government entities depend on face-to-face meetings and let-
ters. While use of ICT appears to be spreading within public
sector organizations, there was nomention of web-based com-
munication or file-sharing applications within and between
organisations:
‘Mostly we communicate through emails and invitation
letters; for example, when there is a monthly meeting in
the health sector, the health department itself sends us an
email, we participate in the meeting. After termination
of the meeting, they send us the material of the meeting
through the internet (email). NGOs and UN organisa-
tions usually communicate through software, especially
email, and rarely through the telephone. Governmental
organisations mostly communicate through documents,
like their invitation letters are hard copies; they use hard-
ware and most of their documents are hard; still there are
pen, paper and documents in the government system.’
UN AGENCY, BDK.
Use of mass media to communicate with the public was also
limited, particularly in rural areas where national television
and radio offer limited coverage:
‘Actually 95 per cent of our people have TVs in the city
while only 5 per cent of our people watch TV in the
villages. Public awareness programmes via TV channels
won’t help our rural people… Newspapers have gone
from our system because most of our people are unedu-
cated.’ UNIVERSITY, NGH.
4.2 Political economy of stakeholders, ideas,
and interests: policy processes
This sect ion concerns the perceived origins and
contextualisation of policies and the horizontal and vertical
processes through which policies are mediated.
4.2.1 Policy formulation in theory
The governance structure in Afghanistan ideally exploits the
technical capabilities of central ministries and vertical consul-
tation with provincial-level governments. In theory, data col-
lected at the district level are aggregated at the provincial level
and then fed into the policy making process at the central
level. Policy is then formulated in Kabul by Government
Ministries and cross-sectoral working groups and clusters—
with input from Provincial Department heads. Policies are
then disseminated in the form of plans and strategies to the
provinces. Respondents cited few examples where this policy
making process existed in reality.
4.2.2 Donor-driven policies
International donors were said to influence policy significant-
ly because the Government of Afghanistan lacks technical
capacity and financial independence. Over-reliance on foreign
donors was a source of contention in many interviews. NGO
staff and Provincial officials alike responded frequently:
‘The donors provide the funds; through their funding
power they make policy makers accept their wishes
and desires.’ NGO, BMN.
‘Generally, all the work done by MoPH is from foreign
aid as the Government of Afghanistan doesn’t have its
own budget.’ PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, BDK.
‘A foreigner comes in the country but is only allowed to
stay here for 3-6 months. If he/she gets used to the en-
vironment at the first 3 months, he/she will end up
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wasting a lot of time. He/she then will leave and another
person will replace him/her, someone who cannot take
up his/her work. We have seen it many times.’ NGO,
BMN.
4.2.3 Decontextualisation of policies
The majority of respondents considered that policy making
was de facto significantly over-centralised. Lack of capacity
was cited as a cause of the imperfections in policy making
processes. Comments reflecting frustration with the lack of
consultation were expressed, sometimes in strong negative
terms:
‘… most of the time policies are made in Kabul behind
the guarded walls.’ UNIVERSITY, KDH.
‘They should collect data from villages, districts and
provinces and make a policy according to that. But the
problem in here is the lack of capacity. If you go to a
Ministry in Afghanistan they don’t even know how to
write; then how do you expect them to make a policy?’
NGO, KDH.
‘Once the policy is made in Kabul, nobody has the right
to either object or suggest anything. For example, if they
say that the colour of milk is black and you write and say
no it’s white, they will grab you and tell you that you are
not obeying laws.’ PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT,
BMN.
Given the weak domestic knowledge environment, depen-
dence on foreign advisors and donor organisations (discussed
below) has led to formulation of national policies adopted or
adapted from other countries that were inappropriate for the
Afghan context and unsustainable.
‘The sources for all the health policies come fromWHO
[UN World Health Organization]... They conduct re-
search all over the world, they bring the policies from
other countries such as African countries to Afghanistan
and implement them here… they make a guideline and
give it to MoPH and they make their policies according
to that. WHO makes different policies for all developed
and underdeveloped countries.’ NGO, BDK.
‘… in Bamyan, we only have one growing season but in
Jalalabad we have three. If the policy is made in Kabul
and not contextualised well, then it will not work.’
NGO, BMN.
There was a widespread perception that central policy makers
were remote and had had little understanding of the heteroge-
neous ecological and social contexts in provinces and districts.
The remoteness of policy making from the provinces not only
caused a lack of effectiveness but also mistrust among
interviewees:
‘In every village we have different shuras. They should
ask the people’s need from the shuras, and on that basis
they should build their policies.’ CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT, BMN.
‘Those who make policies, they come in bulletproof
cars and they make policies behind the guarded walls.
They don’t know about the situation of Helmand and
about the agriculture and gardens there. Most
policymakers come from abroad to the airport and from
there, they go to their offices. How do you expect them
to know about the situation of Afghanistan? I haven’t
seen any policymakers go to the field to find out the
problems of the people.’ NGO, KDH.
4.2.4 Engagement with the private sector
A range of private sector development activities related to
both health and agriculture was reported. CARD-F
(section 2.2.3) is the multi-institutional public sector-
donor programme to develop commercial agriculture,
comprising investment in commercial value chains and
agribusiness infrastructure. Other donors have also
invested in production enterprises and food storage firms.
Another example is the United States Agency for
International Development’s Kandahar Food Zone
Program which encourages farmers to develop licit forms
of agriculture, cf. opium poppy cultivation. Likewise, a
respondent reported how MAIL, in collaboration with
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, provided sup-
port for the establishment of agricultural input firms pro-
ducing and supplying improved wheat seeds in
Badakhshan.
Private enterprises within the food sector such as salt man-
ufacturers and grain millers have focused on micronutrients,
especially iodine fortification of salt and mineral fortification
of flour, in collaboration with government and international
organizations. There was appreciation of agribusiness when it
was reported:
‘The private sector has done lots of important work here.
For example, they produce several vegetables like cu-
cumber, tomato, etc., they built many greenhouses in
here. Several dairy farms, aviculture farms are built by
t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r h e r e . ’ PROV INC IAL
GOVERNMENT, KDH.
‘Our department had a project with UNICEF, and their
aim was to include iodine into salt… We want all our
p r o j e c t s t o b e l i k e t h i s . ’ PROVINC IAL
GOVERNMENT, BMN.
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While there was government involvement in programmes
aimed at stimulating private sector business to address eco-
nomic development and public health, most projects were
either independent or established through direct collaboration
and support of NGOs. There was a widespread view that co-
herence across sectors required more government involve-
ment and communication with the private sector. Generally,
respondents were highly supportive of private sector involve-
ment, but were aware of the need for further investment to
reach into remote districts and achieve scale and effectiveness
in implementation:
‘The majority of problems we face right now are be-
cause of the lack of a private sector… If we can improve
our private sector it will have a positive impact on the
improvement of food security and nutrition.’ NGO,
NGH.
‘Unfortunately, we rarely have such dialogues [between
government and the private sector]… I don’t think that
the government has such meetings with these sorts of
businesses to financially help these networks.’ NGO,
BMN.
4.2.5 Civil society
Discussions about the role of civil society in promoting agri-
culture and nutrition were not fruitful. Respondents
commented that civil society organisations are primarily in-
volved in politics. In this context, respondents were not refer-
ring to village-level CDCs and Provincial Development
Committees (PDCs) which are constituent parts of the sub-
national governance architecture, but to national organisa-
tions. Ministry officials from Kabul also commented with
some cynicism:
‘Civil society raises concerns as to why police die or
why ISIS is here, and why our road is not constructed.
In nutrition I do not think they have taken any action.’
UN AGENCY, BDK.
‘The civil society prioritises politics, not food security.
They constantly talk about politics, they never talk about
food security.’ CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, KBL.
4.3 Policy coherence, delivery, capacity and resources
This section focuses on policy coherence and coordination
across sectors and between similar organisations vertically
and horizontally. It also considers the ‘reach’ of policies and
programmes, and the weaknesses in delivery.
4.3.1 Inter-sectoral coordination
There was significant evidence of horizontal coordination
at the central government level in Kabul. The UN cluster
system was frequently cited as an important coordination
mechanism. Policy coordination among sectors is largely
considered to occur among Ministries and within the sec-
tor clusters.
‘Within MoPH we have a Public Nutrition Department
that makes a joint nutrition policy for all over
Afghanistan. Organisations like UNDP [United
Nations Development Programme], UNICEF and other
organisations also review those policies. After every few
years they make a guideline book and review those pol-
icies. The Minister of Public Health passes that policy
and then they send those guidelines to all Public
Nu t r i t i on Depa r tmen t s i n t h e p rov i nc e s . ’
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, NGH.
‘We have a cluster by the name of FSAC [Food Security
& Agriculture Cluster], within this cluster are FAO and
all the organisations that work in the agriculture sector;
they indirectly work in the nutrition sector and jointly
we work in this sector. In every project we implement,
the MAIL, MRRD and other organisations cooperate
with us...’ NGO, NGH.
‘We have the WASH [Water, Sanitation and Hygiene]
cluster, nutrition cluster, protection cluster, and we have
separate policies for these… the government is very
weak and they don’t do a lot of work; it’s NGOs that
do everything but still their programmes are in accor-
dance with the government policies.’ NGO, NGH.
Respondents were asked about the linkages with sectors other
than agriculture and health in which investment is necessary to
enable development in agriculture and nutrition. Lack of in-
vestment in physical infrastructure was widely seen as a major
challenge, with the lack of domestic energy infrastructure as a
root cause of underdevelopment:
‘We don’t have any factory in Bamyan... and the reason
is two things. First, people here are mostly poor. And
secondly, we don’t have electricity in Bamyan.’
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, BMN.
The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
(MRRD) were reported to be involved in infrastructure pro-
jects such as road building and irrigation, and their work was
generally received positively. However, there was a common
perception among respondents that projects were too few to
meet the significant challenges, and that new technologies
were not sufficiently utilised, particularly for energy. Roads
and irrigation projects were seen as the most common
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investments in infrastructure. The need for greater investment
in infrastructure supporting food value chains was recognised:
‘We particularly as MRRD have prioritised irrigation
infrastructure as an area for us in the years to come in
order to support the agriculture sector in a more sustain-
able manner that increases productivity... we are looking
into the physical infrastructure in enhancing the value
chain.’ CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, KBL.
4.3.2 Vertical coordination
Vertical coordination was much less apparent than horizontal
coordination. As noted above, perceptions of the origins of
policies shared the predominant view in all interviews that
policies are made in Kabul, usually with the assistance of, or
by, international donor organisations, sometimes copied from
other countries, without knowledge or input from the prov-
inces and districts for which they are designed. Vertical con-
sultation on policies between the centre and the provinces was
not the norm, although greater provincial participation was
reported in project planning and implementation. Attitudes
towards this centralisation were mixed. Some respondents
from provincial governments and NGOs were satisfied with
the level of engagement between provincial and central levels:
‘At the MoPH level, when they make a policy, they
formulate it according to the national development pol-
icy of Afghanistan. For its implementation, they get the
views of provincial officials, NGOs and other organisa-
tions that work in this sector.’ PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT, KDH.
‘There was a guideline about malnutrition. They
organised a 2-week workshop in Kabul regarding that.
We participated in that workshop and now we are work-
ing to make a plan for its implementation.’ NGO, BDK.
Other provincial respondents differentiated between
centralised policy making, and apparently more consultative
processes for project planning and implementation:
‘People say drop by drop a river is created, but our
mentality is that the entire river rains down on us.
When we make policies, we should start from the
smallest points and go to medium and then gather it
altogether but that is not how they do it…They send
p l a n s f o r u s t o f o l l o w. ’ PROV INC IAL
GOVERNMENT, BMN.
‘They don’t invite people from the provinces to give
their views in the policymaking process. But for imple-
mentation of these policies, they do ask… for our views
and opinions.’ PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, KDH.
4.3.3 Horizontal coordination and ‘silos’ in planning,
implementation and monitoring
There was evidence of horizontal coordination through meet-
ings at the provincial level, and from the provinces upwards to
the centre. NGO activities are linked to central government
ministries and NGOs are granted permissions at the provincial
level. Provincial governments therefore, in some circum-
stances, play the role of a coordinating body, subcontracting
official Ministry policies and projects and preventing project
duplication and conflict among NGOs. There was little evi-
dence of integration of objectives and strategies across sectors,
including among provincial departments, and little evidence
of accountability by implementing organisations in practice:
‘The government plays a controller and moderator role
here in Kandahar Province. All the projects are imple-
mented by the national and international organisations,
they are the ones who use resources and they do what-
ever they wish.’ PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT,
KDH.
‘Our main problem is that we don’t have coordination
among DAIL and DoPH... There is a national nutrition
committee at ministry level; MAIL, MoPH, MRRD,
WFP, and UNICEF are in that committee… But at the
provincial level we don’t have such committees or co-
ordination meetings.’ PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT,
BMN.
Some large projects originate with donors and are centrally
managed, characterised by good national level governance.
CARD-F, (see section 2.2.5) is an agricultural project financed
by DFID and DANIDA (Danish International Development
Agency). It is an example of a sectoral programme, working in
14 provinces which is integrated horizontally into the activity
of four Ministries (MAIL, MRRD, MCN and MoF), who
manage the implementing agencies in an effective and coor-
dinated structure.
However, most respondents reported that the implementa-
tion of plans and projects occurs in both sectoral and manage-
ment ‘silos’. Projects often originate with donor agencies and
bilateral organisations and are implemented by large interna-
tional NGOs and consultancy firms which are ‘sectorised’,
like CARD-F, and usually not locally accountable.
Respondents reported that international organisations notify
— but generally do not collaborate with— provincial depart-
ments. Rather, such organisations and agencies report to their
head offices in Kabul and operate according to projects and
policies designed in collaboration with central government
Ministries.
A wide variety of NGOs had smaller agricultural projects
that aimed to leverage agriculture for food security and nutri-
tion. Agricultural policies and projects mainly focused around
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one of three activities: distribution of improved seeds and seed
varieties; value chains and improving access to markets; and
creating home gardens, vegetable patches and greenhouses.
One NGO worker in Nangarhar stated:
‘We consider nutrition in most of our agriculture pro-
jects; food security is also included in it... For example,
we have made vegetable demo-plots to increase cultiva-
tion of vegetables... Besides that, we build fishery farms
and poultry farms…Also we have distributed 220 goats
for poor and malnutrition-affected women. Besides
these, we have distributed improved vegetable and corn
seeds to poor farmers.’ NGO, NGH.
Thus, it appears that there is a form of parallel governance
through which international NGOs and development agencies
operate their own centralised policy making process. The ef-
fect is to sustain implementation and accountability ‘silos’:
one where the implementing organisation takes policy direc-
tion from central offices in Kabul; and another where govern-
ment Ministries issue strategic plans to provincial depart-
ments, implemented through smaller NGOs. There was said
to be little interaction between the two. Government officials
commented:
‘You know, either policy gets developed only on the
government side, and non-government actors are not
involved, or very often this happens to be on the non-
government side and the government is not involved.’
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, KBL.
‘They sometimes talk about parallel governance and in
this case it is like that. The organisations (NGOs) have
their own policies.’ PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT,
BDK.
4.3.4 Policy ‘reach’: sub-national governance
Some aspects of subnational governance work. However, ef-
fective ‘reach’ into the provinces is limited by many con-
straints. Despite the heavy top-down nature of policy making
in Afghanistan, and excepting those projects implemented
from Kabul through NGO ‘parallel governance’ channels,
projects are often proposed at the provincial level, sent up to
Kabul for approval, and then implemented at the local level
within a complex bureaucratic system. As one DAIL official
explained:
‘…now, plans are made on the provincial level with the
coordination of the DOF, Governor’s office, and of the
experts. The project is reviewed a few times in the PDC
[Provincial Development Committee] to check whether
this has already been done and that no other
stakeholders should be working on the similar thing in
the same area. Once finalised, the PDC signs it and
sends it to the Governor but then again, it goes through
the relevant Departments and afterwards to the relevant
Ministries.’ PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, BMN.
Within this system the role of the Provincial Governor was
said to be crucial. While each department has vertical line
responsibility to its central Ministry, the Governor’s office
was said to be the essential vertical link between diverse pro-
vincial level activities, and between the province and central
government activities. The office is the source of legitimacy
for the Provincial Development Committees [PDCs], and is
the mechanism by which PDC decisions can be implemented.
NGOs frequently coordinate horizontally at the provincial
level through SectorWorking Groups (SWGs). SWGs are also
where NGOs collaborate with the respective government
Departments, who then liaise with Kabul via their line
Ministry. Within-sector coordination also appears to be strong
with government departments coordinating with the main
NGO actors within their sector.
The PDCs are the most significant hubs at which commu-
nication and coordination between provincial-level sectors
and development actors occur. Often meeting monthly, these
Committees involve stakeholders in the development sector
from NGOs, government Departments and donor organisa-
tions, and are generally multi-sectoral. Crucially for integrated
agriculture and nutrition projects, this is the only regular and
official point of contact between these two sectors at the pro-
vincial level. All respondents who attended PDC meetings
held them in high regard as a communication and coordination
hub, especially compared to the situation before PDCs oper-
ated. PDCs are forums to coordinate but also tend to focus on
the biggest projects operating in the region such as large-scale
development and construction projects.
‘We [the PDC] are directly in contact with Governor’s
office. The Provincial [Governor’s] office has their own
different sections like political, social, and executive
sections. If the people face problems in any of these
sections, we directly contact the provincial office and
ask them to help solve our problems.’ PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT, NGH.
4.3.5 Policy ‘reach’: sub-provincial coordination
Communication and cooperation activities at local and district
levels operate through formal, informal and semiformal gov-
ernance structures. Respondents commented on the formal
structure of the National Solidarity Programme run by the
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, where
elected CDCs are set up; each chairperson of such committees
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sits on an unelected District Development Assembly (DDA).
CDCs were seen as powerful instruments as a result of their
ability to direct development work, writing proposals and re-
ceiving funds for implementation. However, for this they are
dependent on acceptance and approval of their proposals
based upon policies developed centrally. As instruments of
the National Solidarity Programme managed by MRRD and
DRRDs (provincial Departments of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development), CDCs also work with NGOs locally to pro-
pose projects for their local area. Proposals are written by
CDCs with the assistance of the NGOs and then approved at
the provincial level by government department members.
NGOs appear to link closely to organizations at local and
district levels. Nevertheless, limits were reported to constrain
community involvement in local activities and decision mak-
ing because of lack of information, and because initiatives
seemed to trickle down from higher levels of government.
This system of sub-national governance was re-envisioned
by the World Bank in 2016 and is fundamental to the new
Citizen’s Charter.
In addition to the CDCs, there are informal councils, the
shuras, for considering specific issues. The degree to which
these informal groups are consulted or involved in projects,
however, is also limited. Shuras lack the power that comes as
an official state institution. Nevertheless, shuras have local
significance within traditional culture and structures. They
may constitute both a bridge and a barrier between traditional
eldership and the political/technocratic authorities. This cre-
ates a tension between traditional authorities and a younger
generation of activists:
‘Now in every district and village we have councils; we
have parents’ shuras, teachers’ shuras... In every village
we have d i f f e r en t shu r a s . _ PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT, BMN.
‘If the policy makers want to work with people in the
current time, there are two kinds of people in
Afghanistan; the first kind is the elders whose views
can be accepted, even while they don’t have knowledge,
and the second kind is the educated people.’
UNIVERSITY, BMN.
4.3.6 Short-termism
Criticisms of policies and projects expressed by interviewees
can be grouped into two broad areas related to the externally-
driven agenda within a short-term framework, and the lack of
accountability to the provinces and to the wider society.
Short-term projects were seen as a major problem because
of lack of sustainability, linked to the over-dependence on ill-
conceived central planning. Donor organisations were consid-
ered to be responsible for perpetuating a culture of short-
termism. Insecurity leading to rapid rotation or replacement
of staff accentuates this problem. To combat this, a shift from
projects to longer-term programmes was seen as desirable, as
was reducing dependence on funding from foreign donors.
The following comment reflects the views of a number of
respondents from NGO and government sectors:
‘These programmes should be long-term. The peoples’
capacity should be built so that good changes will come
in terms of their nutrition and life. It would be better if
NGOs work for 2-5 years because just like in business,
the first year is an advantage while the next is loss… If
they work for a long time, agriculture and livelihoods
would be improved.’ NGO, BDK.
Given the scale of Afghanistan’s problems it is perhaps not
surprising to find an emphasis on humanitarian relief
programmes and policies. Within the nutrition sector this
means distribution of emergency food rations and clinical
treatment of severe malnutrition (section 4.1.5). While it is
beyond question that such initiatives are highly important,
there was evidence of a need to move towards a more strategic
approach based upon long-term, sustained investment in the
agricultural and nutrition sectors to complement the focus on
emergency response:
‘For me, since it is a country coming from emergency,
the emergency network has been really influential…We
are thinking about slowly building capacity to move out
from emergency to more protected and developed nutri-
tion programmes.’ UN AGENCY, KBL.
4.3.7 Lack of accountability
Lack of accountability was linked also to a pervasive culture
of corruption which not only siphoned money away from
where it is needed but also distorted the programme priorities
and the targeting of resources. Allegations of money wasted
by organisations and by the government was also a frequent
source of dissatisfaction. Criticisms from two provinces iden-
tified high operational costs within NGOs and aid agencies, as
well as misguided, ineffective and symbolic projects without
practical value.
‘NGOs have built many places to keep raisins and they
spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on them, which
is not very useful, and no one really uses them. The
organisations and NGOs should spend the budgets on
m o r e u s e f u l p r o j e c t s . _ P R OV I N C I A L
GOVERNMENT, NGH.
‘The things that have been done here are from the NGOs
and not the government. The greenhouses that have
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been built by some of the NGOs are only symbolic and
nothing else.’ PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, KDH.
The most frequent criticism of project implementation was the
lack of monitoring and evaluation. The formal systems that
were said to operate were explained by a member of DAIL:
‘Provincial Councils, District Councils, and civil society
organisations always monitor the implementation of
projects. Besides that, in the structure of MAIL there
are departments of planning and policies; the Director
of Agriculture along with head of planning and policy
departments always monitor the implementation of pro-
jects.’ PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, KDH.
However, monitoring and evaluation were widely seen as in-
effective. While major NGOs and international agencies were
often seen to be accountable, the local project implementing
partners were not viewed as accountable. Insecurity limits
accountability: activities were rarely checked by people on
the ground, and CDCs and shuras were said not to have an
official mechanism of monitoring and evaluating
programmes:
‘There is an accountability mechanism that exists but it
is more on paper, not actual.’ PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT, KDH.
‘Sometimes you have completed the project, which
didn’t work, but it benefited the people implementing
it and they want to repeat it because they will benefit
from it. So you do something even though you are ac-
tually corrupting the whole system and you know it is
not benefiting the people.’ UN AGENCY, KBL.
4.3.8 Limited technical capacity
We have noted the heavy dependence for the delivery of pub-
lic services on non-state organisations. Nevertheless, there
was evidence that some public services are offered through
government departments at the provincial level, such as mon-
itoring of food supplementation (salt). Also, respondents not-
ed public agricultural services such as extension but these
weremostly concerned the distribution of seeds and fertilizers.
Programmes were typically scattered, irregular and were said
not to reach remote regions.
‘Both DAIL and other organisations teach farmers how
to use fertilizers for improvement of their land… These
programmes are not regular, to allow farmers to practise
these things and convey this information to all farmers.’
NGO, BMN.
Generally, government departments were seen by different
stakeholders to be lacking capacity to handle projects and
contribute to policy making. Insecurity is a significant factor
in discouraging skilled staff from assuming front-line posi-
tions. Incompetence within government Ministries and
Departments was also reported to be a serious problem by
(I)NGO officials. Evenwhere technology for knowledge man-
agement is available staff may not be trained to use it. There
was a view that lack of government capacity was also due to
insufficient salaries. Competent staff were recruited by NGOs
or promoted to national level where they could receive higher
salaries.
‘We are working in several districts but trust me, the
[government] staff aren’t working at all… Some gov-
ernment staff are illiterate; they just sit in their chair and
wait for a bribe.’ NGO, KBL.
‘For example, the Department of Education staff are still
busy with pen, paper, documentation, and ruler, even
though GIZ helped them with 18 computers last year
and now maybe they have more than 50 computers.
But they still use pen, paper and ruler.’ UN AGENCY,
BDK.
‘There are a lot of professional staff in the (non-
governmental) organisations because the salaries are
much more than [those of] the government; everyone
seeks a job in (non-governmental) organisations.’
NGO, KBL.
‘The staffing of governmental organisations is more
than they need. For example an organisation which
needs only 60 staff, now has about 180 staff but their
work isn’t appreciable at all and their skills are very
low.’ UN AGENCY, BDK.
4.3.9 Frail human capacities
Corruption is widely seen as a government problem, yet has
knock-on effects for development projects: corrupt and nepo-
tistic hiring practices were also said to be common within
government departments. All respondents acknowledged that
primacy should be attached to the appointment of people with
technical skills, who will often be of the younger generation.
Even where there were well-educated young staff, they were
said to have to operate within the constraints of organisational
and cultural norms. Different UN officials commented:
‘This is a big problem in the government, that they hire
people based on relations and ties but not based on mer-
it. For example a person who doesn’t know much about
agriculture can be working in a very high position in the
MAIL… Someone who has graduated from a law fac-
ulty is working as a director in the MAIL. People who
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work in the agriculture sector must be specialists in that
field, and they must have good experience.’ NGO,
BMN.
‘They should abolish the older staff slowly and they
should bring the young generation to work, but regret-
fully they don’t hire the young generation.’ UN
AGENCY, BDK.
Like security, physical remoteness was cited by a number of
interviewees as a reason for the lack of skills at the provincial
level, and ineffectiveness:
‘In Bamyan we rarely find individuals with a high level
of capacity. Because Bamyan is a remote area, profes-
sional staff hardly agree to come here for work. Only
people with less capacity come to work here.’
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, BMN.
5 Discussion and conclusions
Emerging from this evidence are important themes concerning
how agriculture can be leveraged for nutrition within
Afghanistan. In a number of respects, the weaknesses identi-
fied resemble those identified by Levitt et al. (2011) during the
period 2002–2007. Nevertheless, there have been changes in
context and issues in the intervening decade, policies have
proliferated, and new nuances have emerged in the policy
agenda and in governance. This section addresses areas where
changes a re needed in po l i c i e s and processes .
Recommendations follow in section 6.
5.1 Gaps in responses
First, in relation to results, there were significant gaps in our
expectations about the social and political mechanisms needed
to reshape the food and nutrition environment:
& There was almost no articulation of the ways in which
women’s participation in agriculture could help nutrition.
The multi-sectoral linkages envisaged were largely absent
in understandings of agriculture and nutrition policies. For
example, there was no evidence of knowledge of MAIL’s
recently formulated strategy (MAIL 2015). The only re-
spondent who was able to explain the importance of wom-
en in agriculture was from MoWA. We should note that
gender equity is now prioritised in a range of policy doc-
uments, but awareness is limited, and adoption and imple-
mentation will be considerable challenges.
& Apart from the huge role of NGOs as implementing orga-
nisations of public projects, there was no evidence that
national civil society organisations were engaged in
advocacy on technical agriculture and nutrition issues.
While many organisations are active in development, a
culture of awareness of sectoral and inter-sectoral devel-
opment linkages and agriculture and nutrition was weak,
and knowledge of shared experience was limited.
& No respondent cited nutrition education programmes or
campaigns of advocacy and awareness that could influ-
ence both consumer behaviour and public policies. Policy
and programme linkages to the education sector were
equally deficient. Schooling is, of course, another chal-
lenge especially in respect of gender issues in attendance
and attainment. Curriculum development that includes
food-based approaches to better nutrition are essential
for rural and urban situations alike in the context of the
triple burden of malnutrition.
5.2 Policy framing and coherence
This section consider key elements of the enabling environ-
ment for agri-nutrition policies. The most trenchant criticisms
concerned policy framing and policy-making processes. The
framing of policies was said to be donor-driven, ill-designed
through top-down processes, reflecting insufficient knowl-
edge and awareness of local realities and unable to account
for provincial social, economic, political and ecological het-
erogeneity. The knowledge base concerning the rural reality is
shaky. Consequently, provincial stakeholders did not have
confidence in the central policy makers. In practice they
resented the remoteness of power, short-termism, overdepen-
dence on central and foreign interventions and initiatives that
failed to address local needs or constraints and distorted strat-
egies and operations.
At the time of writing, there were a number of ‘silos’ af-
fecting policy formulation:
& agricultural development has focused on commercialising
production, on employment, exports and strategies to
combat illicit enterprises. Despite evidence of interven-
tions designed to boost nutrition-sensitive agriculture such
as kitchen gardens, fruit production and livestock, little
attention hitherto has been given to food quality, dietary
diversity and nutrition security of vulnerable populations;
& public health policies are largely curative and
disarticulated from the prevention of malnutrition through
agriculture and food-based approaches;
& humanitarian programmes and food supplementation pol-
icies to treat acute malnutrition due to micronutrient defi-
ciencies were delinked from longer term strategies to
achieve sustainable improvements in diets through
nutrition-sensitive agricultural production and economic
development pathways
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In other respects, there were positive findings. The cluster
system worked in Kabul, and at provincial level coordination
was said to be fluid and efficient, supporting project imple-
mentation. National and international implementing organiza-
tions were a fundamental and largely successful element with-
in the project and service delivery architecture. Local project
implementation was considered to be more coherent than the
policies themselves, partly due to the efficiency of
implementing organizations even when they were often
resourced from external sources. The office of the provincial
governor and the PDCs were highlighted as potentially effec-
tive structures in local coordination.
Nevertheless, there was much evidence that knowledge
sharing and communication between the hierarchy of national
and subnational levels of government was poor. Research was
said to be weak with data often fabricated, partly for fear of
insecurity during field visits, and there was no systematic ap-
proach to using evidence in policy formulation. Information
flows were fragmented within parallel and often ad hoc com-
munication routes. There was little evidence of knowledge
processes, either through communication from the communi-
ties, districts and provinces to the centre, or of precise policies
from the centre to the provinces. Use of modern information
management technology among government organisations
apparently was insufficient. In separate discussions and
through personal observations, the evidently widespread use
of social media, at least in urban areas, was said to be confined
to private and social purposes.
5.3 Perspectives for capacity and resources
Despite the long trajectory of the Afghanistan Food Security
and Nutrition Agenda (AFSeN) and the evidence of horizontal
coordination, we found a lack of integrated agriculture and
nutrition policies at most levels of governance. Respondents
were aware of broad policy approaches but were unable to cite
objectives and strategies precisely. The approval of AFSeN
offers the opportunity to integrate policies and sectors. The
framing of the problems is sound, but the high level objectives
still have to be translated into feasible and appropriate
programmes in the provinces. In the first place, AFSeN will
depend on successful management of a highly complex,
multi-agency governance structure at the centre.
Implementation will be constrained by limited capacities and
resources. Precise strategies need to be formulated through
consultations across sectors and throughout the vertical archi-
tecture of national, sub-national and sub-provincial gover-
nance. The Citizens’ Charter creates the needed opportunity
and framework, but these are major challenges. Moreover,
existing policies such as the National Strategy on Women in
Agriculture (MAIL 2015) and emerging policies such as that
concerning Zero Hunger should be integrated with AFSeN.
Another requirement is to manage constructively the
dependence on national and international NGOs for efficient
delivery of public services.
In conclusion, major barriers remain to leveraging agricul-
ture for nutrition. These are not confined to the specific sectors
but are symptomatic of Afghanistan’s broader development
challenges. Extreme dependence on external human and fi-
nancial resources shapes policy and practice according to in-
ternational expectations, but fails to deliver efficient and ef-
fective processes and outcomes. In particular, the lack of ca-
pacity and resources within government ministries and depart-
ments along with poor infrastructure remain major barriers to
progress. Significant investment in Afghan human resources
will require continued external assistance.
The apparently intractable insecurity and increasing hu-
manitarian needs of internally displaced people, exacerbated
by refugees returning from Pakistan and Iran, and entrenched
corruption add further strain to the food and nutrition security
system (OCHA 2018a, b). It goes without saying – almost –
that the conflict must be resolved. Meanwhile, management of
the humanitarian-development interface requires deliberate
processes and appropriate resources in order to ensure coher-
ence between approaches to Afghanistan’s acute and chronic
problems through short-term interventions and long-term ini-
tiatives. Of these, agriculture and food and nutrition insecurity
are major but not exclusive components.
Another challenge arises from the fragility of the natural
environment: although interviewees only obliquely pointed to
responses to anthropogenic and natural disasters, the agricul-
tural capacity is highly dependent on climate-sensitive invest-
ment in seeds, irrigation and infrastructure, management of
land and other natural resources.
6 Recommendations
6.1 Governance
Decentralisation of sectoral authority and responsibility for
agriculture and nutrition to provincial levels is not a novel
conception (MoPH 2016), but needs a cautious and compre-
hensive approach, with national political support and public
commitment. Above all, it is essential for negotiation to take
into account the complexities and destabilising effects of re-
gional and ethnic differences and the presence of other non-
state groups and coalitions. As noted, decentralisation is con-
sistent with the new Citizen’s Charter employing distributed
and inclusive forms of governance that embrace local and
provincial structures, both formal and informal. It requires that
the scale of operations strikes a balance between the availabil-
ity of technical expertise and local capacity, and the ability for
sectors and organisations to communicate effectively in PDCs
and SWGs. Capacity at the provincial level is weak due to the
recruitment of skilled individuals to work for (I)NGOs, UN
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agencies and central government for significantly higher sal-
aries, and due to emigration. Increased investment is needed in
departmental government capacity within the agriculture and
health departments.
6.2 Context-awareness
Provincial-level governance potentially will result in policies
that are context-specific, avoiding approaches developed cen-
trally or copied inappropriately from other countries. Locating
budgets and decision making at provincial level should facil-
itate the contextualisation of policies to local realities and
enable more meaningful dialogue among local stakeholders,
and across sectoral boundaries. Overall, it is necessary to for-
mulate a ‘context-sensitive’ approach rather than a model of
‘one-size fits all’ (Nijat et al. 2016). And decentralisation pro-
cesses must be accompanied by a comprehensive awareness
of the security and peace challenges mentioned below.
6.3 Political ‘reach’
The prevailing public-NGO (PUNGO) partnership model for
the delivery of services has merits, despite the political ten-
sions (Newbrander et al. 2014; Poole 2017): at least, it is as
sustainable as, and probably more effective than, any other
form of delivery in terms of reach to remote areas under the
circumstances, and fits well with decentralisation. Programme
and project implementing organisations should be better
linked, and accountability should be clearer, while recognising
that it is they, where security permits, who have an effective
presence and together constitute a ‘functional equivalent’ of
the hitherto absent formal state. Tensions between the centre
and the periphery, between the state and its functional equiv-
alents, and informal political power brokers will have to be
managed sensitively.
6.4 Knowledge and communication
All central and provincial stakeholders will benefit from im-
proved information flows and knowledge management. This
requires further moves towards e-governance: a publically-
accessible knowledge-sharing architecture including up-to-
date internet websites for public sector organisations, with
appropriate links to donor and international organisations, in-
cluding the UN. Increased use of provincial governance
through both line ministries and the governors’ offices, and
district level SWGs are two mechanisms to bridge the current
poor communication flows between national and provincial
levels. Team collaboration and document sharing software
offer opportunities for knowledge management and sharing
for better horizontal and vertical coordination.
Other potential improvements resulting from greater use of
IT include enabling greater consultation in policy formulation
at the central level and improved training in government pol-
icies at the provincial level. This is consistent with recommen-
dations to strengthen the role and performance of traditional
and modern civil society organisations at the lower levels of
subnational governance (Nemat and Werner 2016). Even in
this internet-enabled age, there is a role for national public
mass media.
6.5 Regulation
Afghanistan’s membership of the World Trade Organization
dates to July 2016. This should offer a platform for regulariz-
ing international trade within which domestic trade and invest-
ment policies for a competitive agribusiness sector can be
developed. Regulatory frameworks will beneficially impact
many current problems including but not limited to: undue
reliance on foreign imports; allegations of inadequate food
safety controls; lack of national micronutrient fortification of
foods; and lack of agricultural incentives for farmers and food
chain entrepreneurs. Successful implementation of good pol-
icies will depend, like many other interventions, on curbing
corruption and conflict.
6.6 Investment
This article is hardly the place to reiterate the need for
sustained support for Afghanistan from the international
community which is discussed in other and higher-level
policy fora. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to reiterate the
need for investment in physical infrastructure for agricul-
ture and nutrition, with particular focus on creating the
facilitating conditions for successful domestic markets
and enterprises (Flores-Martínez et al. 2016). Food chain
organisation should also focus on creating processing and
storage facilities and the essential services such as elec-
tricity and telecommunications upon which these depend.
Roads, bridges and energy infrastructure that are resilient
to natural disasters such as avalanches and flooding will
link food chain stakeholders, enhance availability and ac-
cess to stable food supplies in remote areas, facilitate the
development of local agribusiness and expand the domes-
tic agrifood market.
Above all, external support and investment in security
is necessary to enable many other developments to take
place. However, simple answers to conflict resolution will
fail. Transition out of conflict will require sophisticated
understandings of the political economy of war and peace,
and the potential bargains that are necessary to ensure the
peaceful inclusion of conflicted parties in governance pro-
cesses that may not necessarily conform to existing ex-
pectations (Cheng et al. 2018). Meanwhile, agriculture
and nutrition interventions with supporting economic
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developments are still needed to build the human health
capital of the vulnerable Afghan populations.
6.7 Wider implications
It may be that Afghanistan is slipping from fragility towards
failure, surpassed only by a few, mainly African, states. The
situation commands attention, as the Economist magazine
commented last year, ‘Few things matter more than fixing
failed states’ (The Economist 2017). Afghanistan was one of
four cases examined in the LANSA programme. The diverse
Afghanistan contexts and challenges are not replicated exactly
in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, although challenges in
some regions of the last are uncomfortably reminiscent of
Afghanistan. Policy makers in the wider region and in parts
of Sub-Saharan Africa and even Central America will recog-
nise common challenges, for which the appropriate policies
may resemble the recommendations included here.
Policy lessons about decentralising public services
have a wider application than just failed states, as previ-
ous work on South Asia and East Africa shows (Gillespie
et al. 2015; van den Bold et al. 2015). Lessons about
better integrating agriculture and nutrition policies to ad-
dress the burdens of malnutrition and achieve global de-
velopment goals apply much more widely still. Many peo-
ple live in areas of ‘limited statehood’ due either to on-
going conflict – the Middle East and Africa - or are strug-
gling through the long haul from post-conflict status to
stability – Colombia – or going in the other direction –
maybe Nicaragua, Mexico and Venezuela. Managing the
humanitarian-development interface is important, even
under conditions of ‘mere’ natural disasters, let alone con-
flict. Many more people, both in South Asia, other devel-
oping regions and in advanced economies, suffer from the
chronic effects of geographical and cultural remoteness
from centralised policy making and an inefficient reach
of public services. What currently works for agriculture
and nutrition in Afghanistan is the cluster system of co-
ordination at central level, inter-sectoral working groups
at the provincial level, and extraordinarily dedicated peo-
ple and organizations implementing national programmes
in fragile areas. But there is no policy blueprint.
Overall, the weaknesses we have identified show that
appropriate and inclusive policy formulation, multi-
sectoral approaches to reducing malnutrition, and
leveraging agriculture for nutrition do not work well in
Afghanistan. Change needs the combined efforts of the
national government, civil society and the international
community to re-envision policy processes by adopting
decentralized and territorial approaches to integrating
agriculture and nutrition and wider development objec-
tives (Poole 2017).
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